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THE PRIVACY OF RELIGION IN THE SELF-MANAGING
SOCIETY
by

Spiro Marasovic

Spiro Marasovic (Roman Catholic) is a priest and theologian from Croatia,
Yugoslavia. This article was originally published in Crkva u Svijetu (Split), Yugoslavia,
and was translated wilh the permission of Lhe publisher and Lhe author.
"Freedom which is only for supporters of Lhc government, only for members of one
party-no mauer how numerous they arc-is not freedom. Freedom is only freedom for
the one who thinks differently. This is not because of some fanatical "righteousness " bur .
in its very essence, all that is instructive, good and purifying in political freedom and its

essential effect, is nullified if freedom becomes a privilege." R. Luxemburg.!

On June 25, 1986, was the Twentieth anniversary of the signing of an agreement between the
Holy See and the government of the Socialist Federal Republie of Yugoslavia. Mter a relatively
long period of post war struggles, this document was supposed to represent a positive initiative in
relationships, not only between the Holy See and Yugoslavia on the state level, but also of the
Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia on the level of society. Now we have the opportunity to
ask ourselves whether and how far this agreement fulfilled its purpose.
First we must immediately say, clearly, that it is more than obvious that this agreement has
been for us a great step forward in Church life and its fruits are obvious to anyone who has eyes to
see.

For example, following the agreement, bishops no longer have any problems communicating

�ith the Vatican, which at least until the Council was difficult and full of problems. The same is
true of opportunities for priests and monks to travel abroad to study or work. Following the
agreement also, theology students in the armed services are no longer singled out for special
treatment, as was previously the case, and other similar instances. It seems, llowever, that such
changes have been best realized on the level of Church and state institutions while points of
disagreement on the level of the individual believer in society which were also obvious before,
remain unsolved even after the agreement. the following facts demonstrate this:
a/ Despite all constitutional and legal rulings as to the equal rights and political equality of all

peoples and citizens, regardless of their ideology or religion, which (among other things) are
founded on the oft mentioned and publicly admitted fact that, along with many other members of
this society and citizens, believers took part in the People's War of Liberation (World War II) and
in the Socialist Revolution, even 40 years after the war these same believers do not have any real
opportunities to attain any kind of significant social or government functions or positions. Nor are
there any believers in any of the forums where socially significant decisions are made. There are
none even in the slightly higher forums of the Union of Socialist Working People of
Yugoslavia,2 where they have huge numbers of members nor in the Union of Socialist Youth
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where they also have a large membership. The security services and armed forces (meaning the
officer ranks) need not even e mentioned. Even some alibi exceptions which could be found here
and there, cannot detract from this fact. Since this situation has remained the same for 40 years and
even though it has no constitutional or legal foundation, and its is equally widespread throughout
Yugoslavia-we may well ask ourselves: why is this the case?
b/ Since such a chronic and constant discrepancy exists between what has been stated and how
that statement is put into practice, it would be reasonable to expect that at least the mass media
(for whom the USWPY is publisher) would deal with it more often and in a serious manner, and
would expose it and distance themselves from it. But no; instead of that in those same media we
find a constant campaign against believers and the Church. Even though they are de facto shut out
from political and social involvement, believers are constantly being accused of supposed
transgressions of constitutional and legal rights, of

clericalism

and similar things. If this

accusation came only from party agents, that could still be understandable to a certain extent, as
communists by definition are atheists and as such they accept atheism as part of their program. But
how is it that where religion and the Church are concerned, there is no difference between party
members who are by definition atheists, and members of the USWPY which should not consist
entirely of atheists. One again we ask ourselves, how can this be?
c/ On the basis of the constitutional ruling concerning the separation of Church and State,
clerics in Yugoslavia are banned by law from any kind of political involvement However, there
are several cases of priests and some bishops who have received state awards. Since the work of the
Church and believers is evangelism, pastoral care, catechism, theology, spirituality, charity and the
like, and as we know that the state docs not give out awards for such activities, the question arises:
what other reasons were there for these to be awarded? If we set aside several cases where it is a
case of obvious cultural or scientific achievements, it is clear in the case of these bishops, that
these things were not the reasons. This is why we wonder: did they not receive rewards for political
services-i.e. for services carried out precisely in the field where they should not be involved by
law?
So, here we have outlined the problem in general and also focussed our attention on the
constitutional ruling which states that in Yugoslavia religion is the "private affair" of every
individual, suggesting that the answer to these questions may lie in the multitude of interpretations
and inadequate application of this ruling.3
I. THE THEOLOGICAL-ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM.
Christian-Marxist dialogues in Yugoslavia more closely resemble bilateral monologues than
that which we normally understand when we usc the term dialogue: Like the fox and the stork in
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the well known fable, who entertained one another but always in such a way that the guest could
not even taste the food offered {the fox is unable to cat from a narrow jar because he does not have
a beak like the stork and the stork is unable to like the offered porridge because his beak gets in the
way) so in our dialogues we have not come much further as regards methodology. In these
monologues in fact all that happens is a public recitation of what we already know and a public
suppression of also well-known facts. Both what is publicized and what is suppressed are well
known to both sides, but we still remain· quiet about it, or rather we simply pay no heed to it The
suppressed side of the monologues is actually mutual suspicion and distrust. There is no

�

y

conviction as to the sincerit of the other party-or any co� iction that there is no ulterior motive
·hidden behind what is said.

As far as the Catholic Church is concerned, its thoughts, its goals, its aspirations really hold
no secrets and no hidden motives. All its teachings and desires are contained in documents of the
government, and whoever proclaims freedom of religion (including Roman Catholicism) on his
territory must also realize that freedom presupposes and includes the freedom of believers to accept
and to identify with the Church's creed and with its aspirations. These are all included in these
documents.
They state that the Church, even if it wanted to , cannot deny its internal and external form.
The Catholic faith has its own anthropology, its own scale of values, its own way of looking at
life and things which to a greater or lesser extent differentiate it from other groups or movements,
be they secular or religious. A non-Catholic naturally, cannot accept these Catholic viewpoints and

attitudes, but if someone approaches these issues from a government position, then he/she must of
necessity know and respect them. For, the freedom of religion ensured by oUr constitution must
mean the freedom of the creed which the believer actually believes and not the freedom of some
religion which a non-believer imputes to a believer and then interpret what he/she has imputed.
For this reason it is vital to understand how we believers see, understand and experience the
constitutional statement that our faith is the private mauer of every individual, and the more so
because the issues surrounding this are extremely vague and confused. Our approach to this
problem is subject to certain principles which are not exclusively Catholic or Christian; and as
such could be described as general. We will briefly outline them below.
I. The Right to Integrate Thought and Action.

Freedom, defined as the known possibility of a new way of life, is not born and does not have
its origin primarily outside or inside of a human being. No slave is free of his/her chains (unless
he has never felt his/her chains to be degrading) until he/she turns his/her back on them and breaks
them inside himself/herself. Only as the tlood of the realization of freedom overwhelms his/her
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inner being, do the external chains and defences also fall. However the one who has come to accept
his/her chains as though it were a normal condition, who identifies himself/herself with them, will
never be able to throw off even the chains that hold him/her externally, because freedom must be
total (integrated). External freedom is always preceded by internal freedom, and at the same time
assumes it. Internal freedom alone, without the external is torment, and external freedom alone
without the internal, is a tragedy.
What is true of freedom is also true of the relationship between the human inner life and the
external world in general. As thought always precedes action, so action makes a thought reality. A
life worthy of a person is therefore only that life where to a substantial extent thought and action
are integrated. All else is torment or lies. Therefore to force someone to say or do something
which he/she does not believe, is to force him/her to live a lie, a life not worthy of a human
being. We are not talking here about so-c.alled "freedom of thought and conscience," but about
freedom to express one's thoughts and freedom to live according to one's own conscience. A
human's thoughts have always been directed at freedom and thinking people have always through
what they like and how they like. This is not the gift of any regime or of any revolution. But the
freedom to express one's thoughts and the freedom to live according to one's own conscience �
depend on external social factors. The level of humanity of the particular regime of society depends
on the extent to which it allows its subjects to live an in�gratcd life (i.e. where they

can

freely

express their thoughts and freely live according to their beliefs). A person who within his/her own
society is unable to act according to his/her internal convictions, but rather according to some
sociological principles, would be a social and political schizophrenic, living two lives, one his/her
own, the internal, and the other an alien one, the public life. A society which accepts for itself
thoughts in public which arc opposed to the opinions of the majority of its members would in this
way force its citizens to live as hypocrites. At the very least it would be a hypocritical society. Of
course we understand that the fundamental human right that a person can live and act in accordance
with his/her convictions is not absolute, but is limited by the same right of others, wheth.er the
person acts as an individual or as a group.

2. The Precedence of Conscience over Truth.
This awareness is in fact fairly recent even in the Catholic Church so that the late Pope John
Paul I once publicly admitted how in its time the Council's declaration on freedom of religion
"Dignitatis humanae," produced a theological crisis in him. Even today Archbishop l'vl. Lefebvre
and his not so unknown followers and sympathizers bear witness to the fact that he is not the only
one. For the principle by which they had been brought up, which is quite correct in itself, that
truth and error cannot have the same right to co-exist, had at times and in some places been
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interpreted and practised in such a way that there was no room for legitimate pluralism and for the
integrity of one's own conscience. Therefore there was at times a pressure exerted in the name of
truth on a person's conscience to an almost incomprehensible extent.
The Second Vatican Council sought once and for all to put an end to all this. In so doing, the
Roman Catholic Church did not deny its deep awareness that it is the only true Apostolic Church
in which there is the fulness of revelation, and upon that Revelation the truth is founded which it
is responsible to bring to the whole world.4 It did not deny its lasting doctrine that each one is
responsible to seek the truth and to order his/her life according to that truth. This still stands as
before. But in spite of all this, that is in spite of this awareness, the Church publicly teaches that
truth, even if it is its own, may not be forced on anyone, nor even hinder anyone to live according
to his/her own conscience which may not be in accord with our "truth." For the right to live
according to the truth of one's own conscience does not arise from the truth itself, but from the
nature of each human being.
.
"This Vatican Council", it says in the document "Dignitatis humanae," "proclaims that every
human being has the right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all peoples must be free
from pressure from individuals or social groups or any kind of human authorities, and that in
matters of faith no one should be compelled to do anything against his own conscience, whether in
public or in private, alone or together with others, within the limits of duty. It also proclaims that
the right to religious freedom is founded in the very dignity of every human being, as we learn
from God's revealed Word and from our own reason 5
...

Having thus interpreted the right to freedom of conscience as part of the dignity of every
human being and not on any supernatural grounds, the Roman Catholic Church b y logic admitted
that same right for all who are included in the term "humans." Of course that means everyone-the
Church did not preserve the right for itself alone. But it does seek it for itself! This is not because
it alone is the oniy true way, but because this freedom is part of the dignity of every human being
and whoever ignores this, sins against human dignity. Therefore the Church is not seeking
anything that it docs not allow to others, so that every speech about how the Church is seeking
some kind of monopoly or privilege, if it is not pure deception, is a sign of ignorance of the
subject in question.

3. The Legitimacy of Democratic Authority Comes from the People.
The Catholic Church, since it is "catholic," which means universal, lives and works in
many societies which differ from one another and in social systems which may but do not
necessarily conform to Christian principles in their public life. Thus the question arises: what kind
I 9

of relationship should there be between .the believer's right to integrity of thought and action and
the logic on which the particular society is based, meaning a way of thought which is obligatory
for everyone. Is it a necessary principle of the Roman Catholic Church that its conscience and
principles should become public-i. -e. political consciousness and the conscience of every
individual in society?
No, in no way do the principles of the Roman Catholic Church demand this. A society if
the majority are Catholics, may accept Catholic thinking even in the public arena (after all it must
have some kind of philosophy!) but as most contemporary societies are pluralistic and as the
Church seeks freedom for itself arid for other religions and world views, it is understandable that it
cannot seek to be the only and exclusive way. What the Church is seeking is that the public (i. e.
socio-political thought and logic) should not oppose what it is trying to do and what members of
that society want, at least-if it would not work any other way-what the majority wants. It is
not the same thing to accept somcone's ideas (which all public authorities must do) and to adopt
them (which authorities do not have to do). No sLate needs to adopt Catholic thought iii its
polirtical l ife, but if that state is in fact a democratic system, by the force of the logic of
democratic life, it will have to respect that way of thinking, in the sense that it should not be
allowed to make any decision opposed to that thinking and that it will not demand that believers
perform any tasks which are in conflict with their faith. This in fact arises out of the very term
"democracy" -the power of the people. It is unthinkable that a nation, or rather the majority of a
nation, should rule itself like a schizophrenic, in a manner completely opposed to what it really
thinks and desires. Believers constitute the Church, but they also are part of the demos which is in
power. Even if believers arc in the minority in some society, or rather when in some area adherents
of any faith or world view form a definite minority, even then it is necessary for the public
authorities, as far as possible, to take into consideration the consciousness of that segment of the
nation. It cannot be any other way if politicians in a tkmocrac.:y arc only delegates of the people
and not holding power endowed by some mysterious higher authority. Otherwise believers (or
members of minority fai ths) in that kind of society would be mere second class citizens, a
common work force, and no more.
The "privacy of religion" therefore, according to these principles, can only mean that a
certain belief is not official or normative in public matters, that it has no privileges and that its
tenets are not in any way binding to any other member of the same political group. But it cannot
mean that privacy is actually a synonym for "non-existencc"-that is that the authorities can
behave towards believers as though they are not believers, that jt is able to ignore the existence of
religion and the Church. Moreover it has no right in the name of some other tenet, to oppose that
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religion and Church, or rather go against religious groups which exist on its territory. No political
power has anyone from whom to receive a mandate for something of that nature. "The privacy of
religion" means that the people for justifiable reasons have taken their religious life and religious
issues out of the jurisdiction of the civil authorities so that each one is permitted to and able to
believe whatever he or she likes and to practice the religion he or she chooses without any kind of
repercussions in public, socio-political life. B ut the "privacy of religion" does not mean being
wriuen off publicly, the disqualification of one or more religions for the advancement of some
new, public and all-encompassing negation of all of them both collectively and individually.

II. SELF-MANAGEMENT-POLITICS OR SECULARIZATION?
What at first sight characterizes self-managing socialism as a unique socio-political
system amongst all known systems, and what is important here, is that this system seeks to be ·
socialism with the greatest degree of democracy, democracy with the greatest degree of socialism,
secularization with no kind of belief, and belief that Marxism is the same as secularization. This
combination of democracy and socialism, belief and secularization, all within the bounds of the
dictates of the proletariat, cannot fail to have consequences for the life of faith and the Church. For
it is significant that according to Marxist philosophy, the period of government by the proletariat
is relatively short but intensive, a time of subjective alignment of social forces towards a
communist society, in which, as is well-known, there will no longer be any religion or church.
Therefore in this context, let us look at what the phrase 'religion is the private matter of the
individual" could mean in socialist jargon. First of all we must sec how far a secularized society of
a socialist type allows religion and secondly how far the socio-political dictates of the proletariat
allow the privacy of thought and conviction.

1. The Subjective and the Objective in the Politics of Socialism.
Yugoslav socialism has the basic genetic characteristics of Leninism, that is, that version
of Marxism which became so fatally confused at the time of the Third International. .The chief
characteristic of Lenin's Marxism, or as it is usually called "Marxist-Leninism" to differentiate it
from original Marxism, is according to Lenin, because of a lack of the most basic conditions for a
socialist revolution in Russia (the working class, for example, hardly existed), a lack of objective
causes had to be made up by a surplus of subjective causes. Marx himself had ascribed to this
subjective factor an almost messianic role and importance by declaring it to be the sole possessor
of a special, uniquely correct class awareness. B ut even that subjective factor is still not able to
achieve what it seeks. Rather, in practice it functions as mature socio-economic objective
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conditions and circumstances. The communist parLy, as an organized objective factor, according to
Marx, alone correctly interprets historical events and therefore its function is to further direct those
events. But, according to Marx, the party does not create objective circumstances! They are the
fruit of historical laws which cannot be altered or imposed.
Lenin and Leninism means one step further in the development of the self-awareness of
that subjective factor in society. Since Lenin and the Russian revolutionaries had no time nor will
to wait until objective circumstances came around and matured, they added revolutionary
voluntariam to the already existing messianic consciousness of the subjective factor. Thus, from a
party which interprets and directs legitimate social development, came a party, which, according to
its own will, imposes laws onto that development. In no way was Lenin an exception in this
regard amongst the Russian revolutionaries. This brand of voluntarism was also characteristic of
the Russian Nationalists and Anarchists as well as of the Bolsheviks. As the Bolsheviks did not
have the people's mandate-being a party exclusively of one class, and that not even the class
which made up the majority of the people, (for at that time that class was not qualitively
sufficiently developed)-for this reason it was not necessary for them to be accountable to the
people, but only to history.
This kind of messianic-voluntaristic self-consciousness, a typically Russian variety of
Marxism, spread later to all members of the Third International, so that in the way they interpreted
it, "democracy" was understood and practised as power for the people and not the power of the
people. Since the people were divided into classes, they could not· govern for every government is
from one particular class, and as the working classes, who should have taken power, had not yet
attained the status of a "class in its own right," they were not able to govern. Power then fell
exclusively to the Party, as one segment in society which was a class in its own right and to
whom history had given the manda:te to rule the people in the name of the working classes.
Armed with this kind of consciousness of its own messianic mission, the consciousness
that they could change the world in any way they felt fit, the Bolsheviks did not think it necessary
to wait patiently for the matuation of social conditions in which religion would die out, as Marx
had predicted it would. Rather they, as the subjective factor in history, decided to hasten that death
even if social conditions were not ready for it. As they could not speed up history, they hastened
the predicted historical outcome, as if they wanted to sec the communist eschaton in their lifetime.
"The privacy of religion," in a campaign conceived and executed in that way, could only have one
meaning given by this subjective factor, and that is the most restrictive sense. For at that time
there was no question s to the separation of State and Church. The only question was: How?
Everything that was done was tactical, aimed at a strategic goal. So any discussion which took
22

. place about this was merely a question of methods-should they approach the Church harshly and
by force, or should they apply some kind of euthanistic skill. Lenin was against proclaiming
religion as a private mauer. 6 He was only in favor of religious groups being declared "private
societies" in the strictly restricted sense, that is not. in the sense of a democratic admission of thelt

p

autonomy, but in the sense that they as suc h lost all su port from public fun ds and all influence

in

schools. ? However, due to its abstract self-awareness and sectarian relationship with the real world,
the bolshevik socialists, regardless of the fact that t hey had declared religion a private matter, did
.

.

not solve the problem of the Church in their jurisdiction, rather they only made it )Tiore complex.
Srdjan Vrcan speaks of the "clccply contradictory and even slightly paradoxical nature" of
_
,.

the real position which religion had reached in those societies "when they had gone beyond the
bounds of classical Stalinism. "

On the one hand religion a s a peculiar cultural im d symbolic system o f socially alien
nature and as the basic of preoccupations and activities ·which arc also alien to the system,
has been treated by the system more or less like a "foreign body" among the members of
the socialist society. Therefore naturally it is squeezed exclusively into the purely private
sphere and excluded from all public involvement. Moreover the system undertakes to
prevent any possibility that religion could become socially or politically significant.
Thus, depending on circumstances, they subject it to severe or mild, p artial or complete
institutional limitations, suppression and pressure. At the same time, religion has emerged
as the only cultural and symbolic system of an alien nature which has been legally
accepted as an institution and is given a certain area of activity and organization which the
social system controls only externally. That is, on the one hand religion is treated by the
system as the private matter of the individual, while institutionally they try to strip it of
all social relevancy and push it not only out of the political arena, but also out of the
entire public realm, transforming it into something without public significance. On the
other hand, the cultural exclusivism inherent in the system tends towards a continual
politicization of religion. In a certain way the very "alien-ness" of religion in a political
and cultural sense almost of necessity leads to the politicization of religion. S

Entirely in accord with this kind of assessment of the state of religion · in socialist
societies, we believe that no great importance should be attached to the fact that the first
constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, drawn up in

1946,

does not mention

religion as the private affair of every individual, whilst the subsequent constitutions of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

do, including the constitution which is in force today,

Whether the first post-war constitution had omitted it because of the stronger influence of Lenin's
opinions in that so-called first phase of "revolutionary statism " or for some other reason, we do
not know. It is not necessari ly significant under whose politi cal influence Yugoslavia was in
.
regard to the approach to this problem of mentioning or nm mentioning religion as a private
matter. B ut as Yugoslavia passed from the phase of revolutionary statism to the development of
self-management, the fact that this is expressly mentioned must be significant, for self
management endeavors to affirm once :.�gain the demos and democracy, which were neglected by the
Bolsheviks. Once things have turned towards the demos and have opened the doors to democracy, i.
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e. the stronger affmnation of objective realities, religion as the private affair of the individual can
no longer be the exclusive object of interpretation and politics of the so-called subjective factors
rather of the citizens whose private affair it is.
"It is a funda�ental truth of self-management strategy," says Vrcan, "that at least on the
theoretical level it rejects the possibility of building socialism under the decisive and
comprehensive influence of the state, and furthermore by means of a distinct minority in power,
which constantly reproduces itself as a minority and which as a result can only exercise its power
in accord with a rigid one-party political system."

9

This kind of strategy presupposes a pluralism

of interests, including cultural pluralism, in which the culture of so-called subjective factors may
only be one of many, but not the only one which is valued. In the Lcninist-S talinist sense
"private" was a restricted concept which created, interpreted, and brought into being subjective
factors in accord with their own political persuasion, for their own purposes, at the same time not
consulting interested parties. But under self-management, which once again affirms the democratic,
this is no longer possible. In a democracy the field of the private can and must be understood in an
affirmative sense; and the right to interpret it belongs to the people whose affair it in fact is.
However, the issue is far from being clarified, as we might have e.x:pccted it would be. That is, it
remains unclear in the area of religion, which and what kind of powers the subjective factor may
retain for itself, as an area where it may carry out its own plans, in accord with its political ideals,
but without in so doing, crossing the boundaries of democracy and democratic freedom. Since this
problem remains unsolved in our country up to the present �e may see the theoretical background
to the contemporary attacks on the Church and believers, or rather the theoretical background to
their actual position in socio-political life.

2. The Subjective and the Objective in the Process of Secularization
Secularization as a socio-cul tural process is not a recent phenomenon but its
interpretation, its extent, and its final goal even today arc still not fully understood or generally
accepted. On the one hand, as we sec the positive side, secularization signifies in fact a justifiable
Iaicization, that is just emancipation of all lay or worldly life from the direct influence of the
clergy, which by strength of belief, dogma, and logic, in fact, do not fal l under their direct control
or leadership. The fact that these aspects of life were once controlled by the clergy-and to a greater
or lesser extent in some places still arc today-was not because they were especially empowered
for these tasks by God, but' solely because they were the only ones at that time and in that p l ace

,

or one of the rare social groups who were able to fulfil that social role by strength of their above
average education and organization, \Vhich made them competent to perform various duties. Of
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course, it goes without saying, that at a time of general illiteracy, no society could ignore the
services of practically the only educated work force, based on a shared faith. It is also
understandable that, lulled by centuries of tradition and practice, many members of the clergy, had
not developed and refined in themselves a feeling for the boundaries between their duties as priests
and those which arose out of their higher level of education and their social status which was
founqe� !Jpon it. Even the feeling for the time when they should give up these secular offices to
lay 'Yorkers was not always sensed in all places. So it happens that what was at one time nonnal
and went without saying, became, in the new age, abnonnal and incomprehensible. Tis is how
what we call "clericalism" arose. This is when in totally new circumstances the clergy tried to
retain for itself authority in areas of life which were no longer their responsibility.
The Second Vatican Council distanced itself clearly from this kind of clericalism. It
underlined as a sign of social maturity the rightness and legitimacy of the emancipation of secular
life from the direct involvement of the clergy in every matter for which they were not fitted
because of their call to the Church. This teaching runs through all the Council's documents
·

.

especially the pastoral c.onstitution "Gaudium et spes", in which it clearly set out as part of the
"autonomy of temporal things" lO Therefore the Church has declared from the highest authority,
loud and clear, that it does not consider itself obliged as a Church, under its mandate given by God,
to be involved in any one particular brand of politics as typically its own, any one .culture as
typically its own, any form of science as typically its own, and so on. Every believer is free to
experiment in these areas and to act in ways appropriate to these areas of human interest. The
Church, as the Church will only become involved in these things when they touch on issues of
faith or morality.

·

There is however another much more broadly spread view of secularization, which sees it
not only as a process of the right emancipation of the secular life, but inore simply the distancing
of people from the Church and r�ligion in genera. This kind of secularization is in fact the Church
and religion in general. This kind os secularization is in fact a synonym for atheism. Such
interpretation of secularization we believers do not sec as positive and we do not consider efforts
made to spread it to be positive. Regardless of how we think and feel, this kind of secularization
even in the Western world is not a new phenomenon. Throughout its history, this kind of
secularization has ebbed and flowed. Today, according to contemporary research arid observations, it
is once again at a stand still, and, according to some, even retreat.
Secularization and democracy, at least in the forms they have emerged and developed in
Europe, go together. However because of its emphasis on distancing itself from religion and the
Church, it comes to be taken over by certain clements which, in fact, have no logical right to it.
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So, for example,

Marxist-Leninism is anti-religion and <\nli-church, but that does

societies built on it are

not mean that

necessarily at the same time secular societies. Secularization is a process

whose results include aversion towards any kind of mediator between anyone or anything.
extreme state,

In its

secularization does not only mean the turning of the world into itself, but also the

turning of each individual into himself/herself.
alone and at the same time to motivate
secularization is distanced from

the attempt to in terpret the world by itself

each human being by himsdf/h erself alone.

Th is is why

religion and the Church 31ot primarily because secularized people

see themselves as more intelligent
they see the church as a

This is

than those attached to some religion or the Church,
its

mediator and

morals. They cannot square these with

but because

belief and morals as the: mediated belief and

mediated

their ideal of autonomy. For them this is heteronomy.

Marxism, however, offers exaclly the thing secularization rejects-a mediator. What sets
Marxists apart from all

other politically active people is their self-awareness

consciousness is, in fact, scientifically a universal consciousness, which they

mediate first of all
universal human

to the

Church.

.

the clergy in a

passes to members of that subjective factor. They approach religion and the

a secularized position rather than from the position of a positive alternative to the

This is

why,

in contrast to

a secularized society where interested citizens,

workers, and communities but not politicians, are involved
citizen, in a

to

consciousness On this is based their right to be the only subjective factor. As

clericized society now
from

responsible

it becomes the truly

Marxism tailored to fit everyday politics, the previous function of

Leninism is

Church

working classes and then to all people, until

axe

that their

religious

in religion as the private affair of every

Marxist Leninist society politicians arc concerned with religion, but believing cit!zens
-

are not involved in

politics although they should have every right to be so

nonsecularized society, even if religion
fact, it never is. And if it is n ot

,

involved. In a

has been declared the private affair of every individual, in

society is divided exactly at the limits set for religion.

Sociological research bears witness to the fact that this is the case in
Although S.

Yugoslavia.

Vrcan used the term "secularized" even for socialist societies, especially

management, to

for self

mean the distancing of people form religion and the Church, he still had to admit

that th is was a secularization which was developing under the considerable infl!Jcnce of politics,"
II

and which in a deepening social crisis d isplayed its "totally specious and superficial nature."
'The false and flimsy nature of that kind of secularization shows itself in almost all

situations where the gap or split between so-called legal society and the so-called real
society shows itself and widens. That is, that gap usually appears as a gap between the so-·
called legal society, which sees i L�elf as almost entirely secularized and in which religion
exists as a definitely minority phenomenon and a more or less "folk lore" clement of
social life, which it is barely worth bothering about, :md the so-callc:d rc:al society where

religion exists as a massive and unavoidable fact of social life with a higb motivation
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potential, able in certain circumstances to activate and mobilize huge numbers of
people:•ll

Or as the same writer says in another place:

"We should expect of course, that secularization in the sense of a lessening in the
social importance of religion and its greater privatization, would naturally lead to a gradual
but continuous fall in the need to discuss the Church and religion first of all in political
terms, and that various political bodies would need to debate the issues less and less, and
also the need take specific political action concerning religion and the Church would

diminish. The very fact that in recent years this is not happening rather the very opposite
is happening, is a sign that secularization in that particular sense is not going exactly the

way one might expect. This is at least a small confirmation of.the fact that religion and
the Church are no longer losing their social significance, regardless how this may please
or displease anyone

and regardless of any kind of proclamation.ul2

Conclusion
If a society is divided into the so-called legal, which is completely secularized. and the so
called real, which is widely religious, and if vertical movement between those two societies is
difficult or impossible in a political sense, in that society religion is not "a private" matter but
public, that is political. This is the case today in the self-managing society of Yugoslavia. The
Church, for its part, offers no kind of support for this kind of politicization for a) it would
necessarily lead to clericalism, which it has rejected and distanced itself from it at the last general
council and b) the constitutional position of the Church in this society does not give it any kind of
opportunity for action. Therefore we consider that the improvement in the promised relationship
between the Church and the State, initiated by the singing of the Protocol twenty years ago and
which is already fairly well developed on an institutional level, should be continued also in the area
where the problems have not yet been solved.
Translated from Croatian by
Janet Kerry
Zagreb, Yugoslavia
1 Rosa Luxembourg "lzabrani Spisi" (Selected writings) Naprijed, Zagreb, 1974, page
293.
2 USWPY hereafter

3 Article 174 of the Constitution of S PRY.
4 ct."Dignitatis humanae, " 1.

5 Idem., 2.
6Marx was not much more
tolerant in this in his "Critique of the Gotha Programme" he
speaks specifically against the "freedom of the religions conscience.'' And Lenin even
maintained that the SDRPR was created amongst other things the fight against any kind of
religions in doctrination. In this connection read S. Marasovic, "Samosvijest Crkve u
S arnoupravnom drustvu." [The Self-Consciousness of the Church in the Self-Managed
·
Society.]
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